"... The geographical limits for the various Atlantic Coast convoys were relaxed, and ships were apportioned to the convoys in accordance with their speeds, provided there was no deviation involving delay in reaching this side. ...

(September) By these means all ships. Allied and Neutral, homeward bound to United Kingdom or French Atlantic ports, whatever their speed, were now brought into convoy."

Neutrals were still suffering heavy losses. Their ships, even when engaged in Allied transport, were not convoyed, either by us or by their own warships.

A discussion arose as to whether it was not in our interest to offer them the same protection as was afforded to our own ships. The objection to our doing so lay in the danger of their giving codes and courses away to the enemy—either advertently or inadvertently.

Here are summaries of a few of the Reports which came in to encourage those who believed in the convoy system, and to confute those who predicted that it would turn out to be a failure :—

"Of 115 wheat ships which sailed from Newport News between the 2nd July and the 1cth of October, four were sunk out of 18 independent sailings, and only one, the *Nova*, was sunk out of 97 ships in convoys. This ship had got separated from her convoy.

Further figures taken later on

showed that the risk of a ship in convoy was only a tenth of that run by a steamer proceeding independently.

There seems no doubt that many of the enemy submarines were afraid to attack a convoy. Not only were they liable to instant counter-attack by